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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the ownership level of managers and the risk averse 
behavior of the firm.  We measure the ownership level of the managers by the ratio of their ownership of the company 
relative to their total wealth for a sample of 69 individuals from the Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest individuals in the 
world for the period from 2001-11 using an unbalanced panel data analysis. The dependent variable is the Altman 
Z-score of each firm and we further test these relationships using financial leverage. The independent variables are delta 
and Vega of the option portfolio of the manager, R&D for the firm, total assets, the age of the manager, the tenure of the 
manager, stock holding of the manager, CEO/Chair duality of the manager and firma age. The Z-score is statistically 
significantly related to size, CEO age, CEO wealth, and duality. Financial leverage is not statistically significantly 
related to any of the independent variables. 
Keywords: CEO wealth effect, firm riskiness, unbalanced panel data analysis, Altman Z-score 
1. Introduction 
Agency theory argues that the objectives of the owners or a firm and the managers of a firm may diverge such that 
managers assume less risk because the managers degree of ownership in the firm is substantially less than the 
ownership level in the firm of the owners since the owners have a substantially larger degree of ownership in the firm. 
Since the managers are risk averse the managers often turn down potentially profitable investments if the managers 
perceive that the investments that are foregone are perceived to be more risky (Guay, 1999, Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The perceived risk aversion of the manager makes the salary and bonus agreement between managers and owners more 
complicated through the introduction of additional option-based compensation. Stock award compensation is one way 
owners endeavor to align the goals of the managers with the goals of the owners. However, managerial wealth invested 
in the firm is likely to be only a small fraction of the manager’s total personal wealth portfolio. Other components of a 
manager’s total wealth portfolio could consist of stocks ownership in other firms, real estate investment, and fixed 
income securities included in the manager’s investment portfolio.  
Research has been done to examine the relationship between the structure of managerial compensation, such as stock 
options and stock awards, and how the compensation structure might influence the manger’s willingness to assume 
additional risk even when the additional returns are adequate (Knopf et al. 2002, Rogers, 2002).However, little research 
has been done linking a manager’s wealth outside the firm and the manager’s risk taking in the firm where the manager 
is employed. Elsila et al. 201 analyzed the relationship between manager compensation structure and a manager’s 
willingness to assume risk. Elsila et al. 201 analyzed managers in Swedish stock exchange listed firms. The authors 
found a positive relationship between the level of manager ownership in the firm and risk taking that is the authors 
found that managers with a higher proportion of wealth invested in the firm where they were employed, the less risk the 
manager would be willing to assume.  
We use a “wealth ratio” defined as the proportion of the manager’s total personal wealth invested in the company that is 
the amount of wealth invested by the manager in the firm divided by the total amount of wealth of the manager. Knopf 
et al. 2002 and Rogers, 2002, show using option pricing theory that a higher delta corresponds to more risk taking on 
the part of the manager and a higher Vega of the option portfolio of the manager corresponds to less risk taking on the 
part of the manager. But the relationship of delta and Vega of the option portfolio with the risk variable when the wealth 
ratio as an independent variable has not been examined. This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: 
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First, no previous paper has looked at the effect of the wealth ratio on risk in US listed firms. Second, most past 
literature have emphasized the importance of effective compensation structure to affect the managers’ risk appetite, but 
no paper have looked upon the total outside wealth of the managers portfolio and how that relationship affects the 
manager’s decision making process.  
2. Theory Development 
2.1 Total Personal Wealth of the Manager and Risk Aversion 
A manager’s total wealth is equal to the total amount of wealth invested in the firm plus the total wealth invested 
outside the firm. Manager’s wealth in the company includes any stock holdings (preferred and common), option 
holdings, and debt holdings. Outside wealth of the manager includes stock and debt holdings of other companies, any 
real estate holdings, such as REITs. Similar to Elsila et al. 2013, we are use the wealth ratio variable to determine the 
risk aversion of the manager. The wealth ratio is defined as the ratio of the wealth invested in the firm to the total wealth 
of the manager. The higher the wealth ratio the higher the risk aversion of the manager. This is consistent with previous 
literature predicting that managers whose incentives are tied more closely to the firm are risk averse (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Berle & Means, 1932). Incentives awarded in the form of options makes the compensation structure 
more convex thus making the manager less risk averse (Rogers, 2002, Chen et al. 2006).  
3. Variables Description  
3.1 Dependent Variable 
Our main dependent variable is the Z-Score of a firm. It was famously used by Edward Altman to predict the likelihood 
of bankruptcy for a firm. (Altman, 1968) The Z-score ratio combines several liquidity, profitability, and efficiency ratios 
to arrive at a final value. Creditors use the model to assess financial distress. A lower score indicates a higher 
probability of distress. It is a good measure for the riskiness of a firm because it combines several ratios and will 
therefore capture a wider spectrum of firm risk. In addition, financial leverage is used as a dependent variable in this 
paper to be consistent with the previous literature. Financial leverage is defined as the ratio of the total debt of the 
company to the total assets. The higher the financial leverage, the greater is the risk profile of the company. 
3.2 Independent Variable 
Our main independent variable is the wealth ratio. This variable is defined as the ratio of the wealth invested in the 
company to the total personal wealth of the executive. The higher the wealth ratio the more would be risk averse the 
manager, and thus the lower would be the financial and operating leverage of the company. 
3.3 Control Variables 
3.3.1 Delta and Vega of the Option Portfolio of the Manager 
Delta of the managers’ option portfolio refers to the sensitivity of the option price with the stock price of the firm while 
the Vega is defined as the sensitivity of the option price with the volatility of the stock. These two ratios have opposite 
effects on a manager’s decision making; delta of the option portfolio corresponds to risk aversion by the manager while 
the Vega of the portfolio is related to more risk taking by the manager (Knopf et al. 2002, Rogers, 2002). Thus, we 
would expect a positive relationship between the delta and the leverage variables but a negative relationship between 
Vega and the leverage variables. 
3.3.2 R&D Activities 
This variable is defined as the ratio of the R&D expenses of the firm to the total assets of the firm. Firms with a higher 
R&D expenditure would have a higher risk profile and so we expect a positive relationship between R&D activities and 
leverage ratios. 
3.3.3 Total Assets  
To control for firm size, we use the log of the total assets of the firm. We expect a positive relationship between the risk 
leverage ratios and the total assets variable. 
3.3.4 Age of the Manager 
This variable is defined as the log of the age of the manager. We would expect a negative relationship between age and 
the risk leverage variables since with age managers would become more conservative and try to preserve their existing 
wealth. 
3.3.5 Tenure as CEO/Executive Position 
This variable is defined as the log of the tenure of the manager in his executive position. The higher the tenure of the 
manager more would be the experience of the manager at the current position, and so more the manager would be 
efficient in maintaining a stable risk profile of the firm. Thus, we would expect a negative relationship between the 
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tenure as a manager and the risk leverage ratios. 
3.3.6 Stock Holdings of the CEO 
This variable is defined as the log of the stock holdings of the CEO in the firm. We would expect a positive relationship 
between stock holdings of the manager and the risk leverage ratios of the firm. 
3.3.7 Duality of the CEO/Manager 
This variable is defined as a binary variable, which is equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero 
otherwise. We would expect a negative relationship between the duality variable and the risk leverage ratios, as when 
the manager/ CEO is also the chairman of the board, he would be more responsible for his decisions, and so would be 
more risk-averse, and so would take on less debt and would be more flexible in his daily activities. 
3.3.8 Firm Age 
This variable is defined as the log of the difference of the founding date of the company and the respective years 
analyzed in the paper. We would expect a positive relationship between the firm age and the risk leverage ratios since 
more mature companies would have higher debt and higher capital expenditures compared to younger firms. 
4. Methods 
Unlike in Sweden where CEO wealth data is publically available (Becker 2006), the US values privacy and that 
information is protected. This desire for privacy may explain why there is a lack of research using CEO wealth as an 
explanatory variable for firm characteristics. In this paper, we use wealth data collected from Forbes magazine in their 
annual Forbes 400 edition that highlights the wealthiest 400 individuals in the United States and their estimated wealth. 
We cross checked those articles with the Execucomp database to provide a list of CEOs wealth data across time. The 
final sample from 2001-2011 consists of 69 individuals and 311 unique firm year observations for this panel set. The 
data needed to be corrected for heteroskedascity and a fixed-effects model was used. Since it is an unbalanced panel, a 
first difference model would not work. Using a between effects model allows us to implement a fixed effects model in 
an unbalanced set. A combination of Bloomberg and Compustat databases were matched with the CEOs to obtain firm 
level variables. Delta was calculated on the cut-off days for the Forbes wealth calculations and gives an accurate picture 
of how sensitive the CEO’s wealth is to a change in stock price. (Core and Guay 2002) 
5. Empirical Results 
The main regression is summarized in Table 1. As you can see the firms Z-Score is statistically significantly positively 
related to CEO wealth and the duality dummy variable, meaning a firm is less likely to go into bankruptcy the more 
wealthy a CEO and if he is also the chairman, though it is negatively related to CEO age. The sensitivity of the CEO 
wealth to stock price changes shows no relation to the companies Z-Score. In Table 2, we look at a firm’s financial 
leverage and find that it is the CEOs outside wealth that is negatively related to the amount of leverage, no other 
variables showed a statistically significant relationship. 
Table 1. Fixed Effects Regression on Z-Score 
 
Coefficient T Score 
 
Constant 98.912 1.89 * 
Sales -5.274 -3.74 *** 
CEO Age -29.055 -2.02 ** 
CEO Tenure -0.737 -0.58 
 
CEO Wealth 4.915 2.60 *** 
Outside Wealth % -2.466 -0.88 
 
Delta 0.219 0.87 
 
Duality 3.008 2.39 ** 
R2 0.1932 
  
N 311 
  
* 10%, ** 5%, ***1% 
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Table 2. Fixed Effects Regression on Financial Leverage 
 
Coefficient T Score 
 
Constant 50.728 1.74 * 
Sales 0.512 0.59 
 
CEO Age -6.457 -1.31 
 
CEO Tenure 0.599 0.44 
 
CEO Wealth -0.779 -0.71 
 
Outside Wealth % -7.861 1.90 * 
Delta -0.459 -0.71 
 
Duality -1.828 -0.54 
 
R2 0.1932 
  
N 311 
  
* 10%, ** 5%, ***1% 
6. Discussion 
The main empirical results of this study point to CEOs running less risky firms as they become wealthier. Though these 
ratios hardly make up the entire risk profile of a company they provide a relatively good starting point to show how 
healthy a firm’s balance sheet may be. The Z-score in particular is an amalgam of several ratios and will point out 
weaknesses in a company’s financials. The lack of significant variables in determining an optimal financial leverage 
point leads one to believe that the CEO level variables are a poor predictor for the amount of debt a firm may carry. 
Though the significance of outside wealth is interesting because it implies that the less dependent a CEO is on the 
success of his firm implies that he is taking less risks. While the firm has less debt in the form of financial leverage, the 
firm may not be maximizing the use of its resources. The firm could have a difficult time incentivizing the CEO to 
pursue risky strategies and exploit its access to credit markets. This could be especially true in our sample that only 
consists of billionaires. The results though may not be very generalizable because we are dealing with a heavily 
truncated wealth data set. The sample only consists of very wealthy individuals, though we still find statistically 
significant results suggesting whatever relationship between CEO wealth and firm risk holds at the upper ends of the 
wealth spectrum. The results would seem to support agency theory in which it is difficult to align the interests of the 
CEO and the firm, though only through lack of risk-taking. Since they have accumulated a large, amount of wealth, 
their risk aversion may have increased and their focus shifted to preservation of wealth. A follow-up study on the 
relationship of wealth and performance would show whether a firm is able to obtain similar returns while taking on 
much less risk, which would point to wealthier CEOs possessing superior skill, though if that is not the case then firms 
face a challenge of incentivizing wealthy CEOs to take risks and take full advantage of a firms leverage capabilities.  
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